MarcusofAr
Posts: 532
Joined: 3/12/2008 Status: offline
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Tal, Luther! Hmmm. Interesting. And I mean that in a good way. I may have leapt into what I perceived to be a breach, based on my knee-jerk reaction to Aristotle's overly simplistic and (IMO) incredibly unfounded definition of Virtue Ethics, when in actuality modern post-Kantian and Nietzchean redefinitions of that concept are more applicable than I suspected. I don't believe that Aristotle's Virtue Ethics are central to Gorean philosophy, because in my opinion, Natural Ethics are the force which generates what I call "Gorean Proto-Ethics." In that model, Natural Ethics come first, and are the "natural" base upon which all culturally-polluted ethics systems must come into being. Ergo, Natural Ethics are central to Gorean Philosophy. But by using Natural Ethics to generate a Neo-Aristotlian "Virtue Ethics" model, as Hursthouse does, side-steps that distinction and overwrites the incomplete model of Aristotle and his Greek peers-- the end result being that it ALL becomes "Virtue Ethics." The weakness of the Aristotlian model, as I mentioned, is in its inability to generate scientifically-based "virtues" based on action. "To do" rather than to "be." Natural Ethics, as described by Norman, discounts theological interpretations and intuitionistic predicates. It refuses to rely upon diety or intuition to generate its supposed "virtues." My argument, as I said, is that Natural Ethics come FIRST according to the Gorean ethical theory. First Natural Ethics, and only THEN Virtue Ethics. But combine them and call the whole thing "Virtue Ethics," and they become two parts of the same thing-- ala' Hursthouse, again. If that's your definition, and if we discard the flawed Aristotlian base-model in exchange for the new one, then I must concede your point. As Norman says: "...the ulterior motive of our paper is to give some aid, comfort, and presentability to certain practices common to the humanities. In particular, I am concerned with the feasibility of objective ethical predication in historiography; without impressing an inappropriate precision on these disciplines. I think that a case might eventually be made that they need not be considered chaotic or irreducibly subjective, or unscientific-- in spite of the fact that their subject matter involves the treatment of those things that matter most to men." --pg. 1, Lange, In Defense of Ethical Naturalism: An Examination of Certain Aspects of the Naturalistic Fallacy, with Particular Attention to the Logic of the Open Question Argument. Princeton University, Ph.D, 1963 Ergo, he intended to explain how human beings might have derived their moral principles and ethical systems in an objective, scientific manner, without having to rely upon divine explanations or intuitive gut feelings. With such an explanation in place, one could empirically study how humans classify good vs. bad according to a scientific--i.e. biological-- model. I know Norman's thesis was based in semantic definitions of systems of ethical virtues-- but even at that early date, the seeds of his later explanation of a natural, scientifically-derived Gorean Morality was already beginning to take root. Good points, all. Take the Aristotlian fallacies out of the equation and the entire landscape alters. I wish you well! _Marcus_
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